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Although motivation is a well-established field of study in its own right, and has been
fruitfully studied in connection with attribution theory and belief formation under the
heading of “motivated thinking,” its powerful and pervasive influence on specifically
explanatory processes is less well explored. Where one has a strong motivation to
understand some event correctly, one is thereby motivated to adhere as best one can
to normative or “epistemic” criteria for correct or accurate explanation, even if one does
not consciously formulate or apply such criteria. By contrast, many of our motivations
to explain introduce bias into the processes involved in generating, evaluating, or
giving explanations. Non-epistemic explanatory motivations, or following Kunda’s usage,
“directional” motivations, include self-justification, resolution of cognitive dissonance,
deliberate deception, teaching, and many more. Some of these motivations lead to the
relaxation or violation of epistemic norms; others enhance epistemic motivation, so that
one engages in more careful and thorough generational and evaluative processes. We
propose that “real life” explanatory processes are often constrained by multiple goals,
epistemic and directional, where these goals may mutually reinforce one another or may
conflict, and where our explanations emerge as a matter of weighing and satisfying those
goals. We review emerging evidence from psychology and neuroscience to support
this framework and to elucidate the central role of motivation in human thought and
explanation.
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Introduction
Human beings are powerfully motivated to understand the nature, history, and future direction of
their environment. Many of our purposes motivate us to get the correct or accurate explanation
of a situation or event (meet relevant epistemic norms of explanation); others motivate us
to arrive at some preferred explanation, where our preference derives from non-epistemic
goals—i.e., goals other than that of accuracy or meeting epistemic norms (Kruglanski, 1980;
Pyszczynski and Greenberg, 1987; Chaiken et al., 1989; Kunda, 1990). The latter goals include
self-justification, attainment of emotional satisfaction, bringing about interpersonal reconciliation,
reducing cognitive dissonance, amusing ourselves, assigning or avoiding blame, and many more.
These goals and motivations we will call “directional,” or simply “non-epistemic.”
It is clear that multiple motives can be at play simultaneously, and these may work in concert
to support a search for the epistemically best or most accurate explanation, or they may conflict,
with some urging us toward correctness, others toward a particular explanatory result that serves
important directional purposes (i.e., those other than satisfying norms of correctness or accuracy).
When our explanatory goals compete we may try to find an explanation that at least partially
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satisfies them all, or we may choose to satisfy some and ignore
others. Our motives in seeking an explanation, whether they be
one or many, mutually reinforcing or directly in competition,
potentially influence all the processes involved in generating,
evaluating, accepting, or giving explanations.
How, then, given that most events of interest might in
principle be explained in different ways, do we decide on
one possible explanation rather than another? This way of
framing the question reflects our focus here on the process of
abduction, or “inference to the best explanation.” In essence,
abduction differs from deductive and inductive inference in
that it takes the fact that some candidate explanation appears
to be the best explanation (in the sense of meeting epistemic
norms, or standards of correctness) as at least partial grounds
for thinking that it is the correct explanation. Such inferences
are ubiquitous in everyday life and important in science as
well (Salmon, 1989). In this article, we propose a theory of
motivated explanation that characterizes the role and influence
of motivation on human attempts to find “the best” explanation
of a given phenomenon.
The Section entitled “Explanatory Processes” identifies three
core processes involved in generating what one takes to be
the most accurate, or epistemically best, explanation and six
processes involved in evaluating explanations for accuracy (See
Table 1 for a brief explanation of each). All of these processes
are “points of vulnerability” (to borrow a phrase from Redish
et al., 2008; Redish, 2013) to biases, heuristics, and in specific
circumstances, directional motivational influences. We note
several points at which these two sets of processes overlap, in
the sense that some of them play a role in both generation
and evaluation of explanations. The Section entitled “To Meet,
or Not to Meet, Epistemic Norms: What is the Motivation?”
describes a (non-exhaustive) range of specific circumstances in
which epistemic goalsmay co-operate or compete in various ways
with motivational goals, and suggests specific avenues for future
research. The Section entitled “Motivated Explanation from a
Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective” reviews work on the neural
implementation of core explanatory processes, of motivation and
reward in general, and of possible pathways for interaction, and
makes further recommendations for future work. Finally, the
Conclusion summarizes our review and proposed framework for
motivated explanation.
Explanatory Processes
Generating Explanations
We propose that explanations originate from three generative
processes (see also Lombrozo, 2006):
(i) Activation of a general sense of what is explanatory, or
what is essential to being an explanation. This includes our
judgment of when some factor is “the real explanation (or
cause)” rather than just a background condition. It also
covers such questions as whether an explanatory connection
is a necessary one (e.g., does a cause necessitate its effect?);
the expected temporal order of causal relations; whether
there can be true “action at a distance”; and whether
TABLE 1 | Component processes in the proposed framework for
explanatory reasoning.
Phase of
explanation
Mental process Description
Generating
explanations
Activation Intuitive judgment on criteria for what
qualifies as explanatory
Memory search Episodic and semantic memory retrieval of
prior events, explanations, or statistical
patterns relevant to the target of explanation
Cognitive updating Integration of new information and prior
knowledge; can involve reinterpretation of
information in memory
Evaluating
explanations
Coherence judgment Evaluate “fit” with prior knowledge; can also
judge coherence of explanation with a
particular psychological state
Weighing evidence Assign value to evidence to compare it
against other evidence, or some predefined
threshold
Simplicity judgment Evaluate number of assumptions or causal
mechanisms involved in an explanation, and
the joint probability of their all being involved
Credibility judgment Intuitive judgment of plausibility; use when
other criteria are ambiguous, or when
explanations compete
Breadth judgment Judge explanatory flexibility to account for
multiple events/concepts across contexts
Depth judgment Judge whether the explanation accounts for
the details of the event or concept being
explained
explanatory connections essentially involve fitting explainer
and explained into a larger, recognized pattern. There
are no definite, agreed upon answers to such questions,
and even everyday intuitions are subject to change with
circumstances. However, for our purposes it is not necessary
to propose definite answers. What we suggest is simply
that people do at least implicitly consult their intuitions
about what counts as a cause or explanation, and that these
intuitions act as an early-stage filter on the overall process
of generating candidate explanations.
(ii) Memory Search for candidate “off the shelf ” explanations,
and for potentially relevant events or associations of various
sorts, is a major part of the construction process. Note that
one can re-do a memory search at some latter point as
one generates explanations, casting a wider net or focusing
the search more narrowly if initial efforts do not produce
anything adequate. It is important that not only are our
memories subject to all the familiar sorts of manipulation
at encoding, during “storage,” and at retrieval, but also that
they are subject to reinterpretation in light of current goals,
including explanatory goals.
(iii) Cognitive Updating. Normally studied in laboratory
settings as the ability to change or add to representations
being held in working memory, cognitive updating
covers many sorts of manipulation of information
(e.g., searching for new pro or con considerations,
reinterpretation of old memories, “on the fly” construction
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of explanatory hypotheses, (re)assigning weights to relevant
factors, (re)evaluation of thresholds levels of credibility
for candidate explanations, judgments of coherence
with background knowledge). These are all subject to
motivational influence both epistemic and directional.
Evaluation Processes
We suggest that six processes enter into the evaluation of
explanations, although not all need to be involved in every
explanation. Some of these evaluative processes appear in the
construction process as well, due to the fact that construction
and evaluation are often not temporally distinct, but overlapping
processes. For example, we may evaluate explanations as they are
emerging and abandon the construction process if a candidate
starts to look implausible. Or we may intuitively evaluate some
bits of evidence or testimony as especially important even if we
do not yet know why or how, and thus work to include them as
we construct candidate explanations.
(i) Judging Coherence or “fit” of a potential explanation with
background assumptions. Conceptual coherence relies on
appeals to unifying theories or causal models (Murphy and
Medin, 1985), and so can be sharpened to the extent that
such theories or models are made explicit. One can also
speak of emotional coherence (Thagard, 2002), and we will
see how this might be distinguished and prove helpful in
connection with specific cases considered in the Section
entitled “Competing Directional Motivation.”
(ii) Weighing of Evidence. This is often intuitive, since there
are seldom explicit criteria for what evidence is important.
What might seem to be a minor detail can turn out to
have major importance (a telltale “clue” spotted by Sherlock
Holmes, or the precession of the perihelion of Mercury).
Note also that weighing of evidence interacts with coherence
judgments, in that some discrepancies may seem to involve
only minor points, while others appear more important,
so that the former will seem to constitute important
evidence, but not the latter. The weighing of evidence for or
against candidate explanations is as important in evaluating
explanations as the weighing of attribute importance is in
determining category membership, and is an important
point of entry for the influence of directional motivation.
(iii) Judging Simplicity. Parsimonious explanations are often
preferred to those requiring more assumptions and other
prerequisites, but it may be that people do not favor (on
epistemic grounds) the simpler explanation even if other
factors appear equal (Johnson-Laird et al., 2004). This
depends in part on how one defines or measures simplicity.
Nonetheless simplicity judgments are important in many
explanatory contexts, intuitive as they may be (Lombrozo,
2007). Note that there is sometimes a “trade off” between
coherence and simplicity, for in principle the simpler of
two explanations is not necessarily the same as that which
coheres better with background beliefs.
(iv) Judging Credibility of a potential explanation. This is
not an entirely independent factor, since coherence can
be a large part of it, as can simplicity (For example, a
candidate explanation that fails to cohere in major ways
with our background beliefs will seem implausible to us; so
also for explanations that appear wildly and unnecessarily
complicated). Nonetheless there is a general recognition
that at least an intuitive judgment of credibility enters into
our evaluations when other criteria are not decisive. The
largely intuitive nature of credibility judgments leaves them
especially vulnerable to directional bias.
(v) Judgment of Breadth. A simple measure of comparative
breadth is that one explanation (E1) is broader than another
(E2) if E1 explains everything E2 explains and explains other
things as well. In particular cases the comparisonmay not be
straightforward, but often it is. For example, Newton’s laws
ofmotionwere by thatmeasure clearly broader thanKepler’s
laws of planetary motion or Galileo’s laws of terrestrial
motion.
(vi) Judgment of Depth. We note three familiar conceptions or
uses of “depth.” E1 is deeper than E2 just in case:
(a) E1 is fuller or more detailed, than E2, or
(b) E1 includes more fundamental level(s) of explanation
than E2. For example, there are many levels of
explanation for psychological phenomena, from that
of historical trends and social forces down through
individual psychological processes, then to neural
implementation, and so on through levels of physical
analysis. Sometimes more fundamental explanations
are also broader, as when Newton’s laws postulated a
very fundamental force of nature (gravity) to explain
everything explained by Kepler’s and Galileo’s laws of
motion, and much else besides.
(c) E1 is given in more abstract/general terms than
E2, pushing toward “virtually mathematical” terms
(Strevens, 2008). This sort of depth is especially
conspicuous in modern theoretical physics, but also
in Ancient theories of musical harmonies and celestial
motions in terms of mathematical modeling.
When multiple evaluative considerations are involved they may
not unanimously favor the same explanation. Thus, there will
again be a problem about how different factors are to be
weighted. There is relatively little discussion of this problem at
present, and no solution—which is to say that although relative
weighting may sometimes be obvious and formulaic, it is often
in practice very much an ad hoc and flexible judgment. As with
intuitive credibility ratings, this opens wide the door to directed
motivational influences.
Each of these generative and evaluative processes constitutes a
point of possible entry for motivational influence. More general
studies of motivated reasoning have as a rule focused on one
or another specific consideration, but some researchers have
suggested rules of thumb for such situations: while arriving at
a desired directional explanation people attempt to maintain
an “illusion of objectivity” (Kruglanski, 1980; Pyszczynski and
Greenberg, 1987); or, they draw the desired conclusion only
if they can muster reasonable evidence for it (Darley and
Gross, 1983); or they try to construct a supporting case “that
would persuade a dispassionate observer” (Kunda, 1990). On
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these views our directionally motivated explanations are either
constrained by the usual standards of accuracy (“mustering
reasonable evidence,” “persuading a dispassionate observer”)
or at least by the appearance of meeting those standards
(“illusion of objectivity”). The last of these—creating the illusion
of accuracy—would of course apply to cases of deliberate
deception as well as to unwitting self-deception. Within those
constraints people may engage in biased processing of various
sorts in order to move things in the direction of a desired
explanation. This general picture works well up to a point.
However, some of the cases we survey below involve witting or
unwitting departures even from those rather flexible epistemic
constraints.
We turn now to discussion of concrete cases of motivated
explanation and of how motivation interacts with the processes
just surveyed. All of these make clear that despite the implication
of the phrase, “the best explanation,” there is seldom if ever a
uniquely “best” explanation. This is obvious in the sense that
there may be one epistemically best explanation of a specific
type (e.g., mechanical, teleological), and at a specific level of
analysis (psychological, neural), but other epistemically best
explanations for other levels of analysis. More importantly for
present purposes, we often have directional motives in addition
to, or instead of, the motivation to achieve accuracy at a certain
level. The best explanation for those purposes may not be the
same as that which best meets epistemic norms.
To Meet, or Not to Meet, Epistemic Norms:
What Is the Motivation?
Directionally Enhanced Epistemic Motivation
Motivating people to be accurate—for example by telling
participants that their results will be judged by others, or made
public, or will affect the lives of others—can produce more
extensive and careful processing, thus reducing some cognitive
biases (Kassin and Hochreichl, 1977; Kruglanski and Freund,
1983; Tetlock, 1983, 1985; Harkness et al., 1985; Tetlock and
Kim, 1987). Add to this the natural motivation to reach an
accurate explanation whenever that is critical to one’s own well-
being, and one can appreciate that humans often attempt to
meet epistemic norms, with directional motivation enhancing
epistemic motivation.
Competing Directional Motivation
Still, humans have a strong tendency to accept and give to others
the explanation that best suits their purposes in a particular
situation, and these often call for the relaxation or outright
violation of epistemic norms. Directional purposes may override
epistemic motivation, or may be overridden by it; or the two
might both contribute to a compromise solution. We turn now
to a series of cases illustrating the importance of explanatory
motivation and pointing the way to future research.
Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias is the tendency to gather, remember, or
interpret information in a way that confirms one’s own views
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). An even broader confirmation
bias can be found in connection with hypotheses under
consideration and to which one does not yet have any particular
commitment. We suggest four specific ways in which a general
explanatory confirmation bias might be implemented. First,
people might interpret a question about the truth or accuracy
of some explanation as the question of whether there are any
good reasons to believe it. This would trigger a search for such
reasons—i.e., for considerations that confirm the explanation.
Second, even critically-minded people might prioritize their
responses, looking first to see whether the view is defensible, then
for evidence that it is false. To the extent that the first search turns
up what appears to be convincing positive evidence, this could
undermine a subsequent search for negative considerations, for
as one became increasingly firmly convinced of the truth of
some theory or explanation, one’s willingness to invest in a
thorough investigation of negative considerations could weaken.
From a cost-benefit point of view, further investigation might
come to appear not worth the time and effort (Beach and
Mitchell, 1978; Payne et al., 1988). Thus, even if one initially
“has an open mind,” the tendency to look first for confirmation
might, if successful, interfere with an initial intention to look
without prejudice at both sides of the question. Third, and by
contrast, if a confirmation search turns up little or nothing
in the way of support for a possible explanation, one might
not think it necessary or worthwhile to look for disconfirming
evidence. One’s overall motivation will determine whether or
not there would be sufficient point in pursuing the matter
further.
A fourth, related, consideration is that the discovery of
convincing positive confirmation can generate an excess of
enthusiasm for and confidence in a given theory, which may
truncate the search for alternatives and bias the evaluation of
rival theories. For example, in cognitive science one sees the
accusation (Churchland, 2011) lodged against some evolutionary
psychologists that they tend to spin out and give credence to
evolutionary “just so stories” while neglecting other potential
explanations, because those support their own postulation of a
multitude of “modules” that have evolved to solve specific sorts
of problems. There is nothing disingenuous in this, of course.
It is rather a matter of growing confidence in and enthusiasm
for a theory biasing one’s search for and evaluation of candidate
explanations (We take no stand here on whether the accusation
is justified in this case).
All four factors can support a general confirmation bias. We
suggest, however, that it is in cases of specifically “my-side” bias
(i.e., where one already has a commitment to or a preference
for some potential explanation) that one finds the influence
of distinctively directional motivation. There is no one sort of
motivation in my-side bias, but an open-ended array of potential
sorts of motivation—maintaining self-esteem, shifting blame,
reconciling social conflict, etc. These thus become special cases
of the sorts of directional motivation we consider in the following
sections.
Resolution of Cognitive Dissonance
The study of cognitive dissonance (the negative affect
accompanying perceived conflicts between our beliefs and
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new information, or between our values and our statements
or actions), is 60 years old and going strong (Festinger, 1962;
Harmon-Jones, 2004). When such conflicts occur, the negative
affect they produce motivates one to resolve the conflict. It
now appears that actual arousal, including measurable physical
arousal, is crucial to dissonance reduction (Cooper et al., 1978).
Similarly, the agent must attribute the arousal to some aspect
of his own freely chosen behavior, thus taking responsibility
for the negative outcome that is the source of the arousal,
rather than attributing arousal to some external source (Zanna
and Cooper, 1974; Cooper and Fazio, 1984). Resolution may
take different forms: changing our behavior, beliefs, values,
attitudes, or some combination of these. Interestingly, in
cases involving self-esteem (e.g., acting contrary to one’s own
standards of what is right), people do not engage in belief
or attitude adjustment if some alternative means of boosting
self-esteem is ready at hand (Steele and Liu, 1983). Where
attitude adjustment does take place it now seems clear that
people do not normally shift their beliefs or attitudes freely, but
under some constraint from prior beliefs. Thus, adjustments
are in a desired direction, but represent a kind of compromise
outcome (Kunda, 1990) or balancing of epistemic and directional
motivations.
There is a direct link between dissonance reduction and
motivated explanation in that the latter is a commonly used
means of resolving the former. When conflict arises between
what we do and what we believe, for example, we often attempt
to resolve the resulting dissonance by bringing our beliefs about
why we did what we did into harmony with our actions or with
one another. Children’s explanations of their own behavior (e.g.,
refraining from playing with a fun toy) can be influenced by
manipulations as simple as the difference between prospectively
mild and severe punishments (Carlsmith and Aronson, 1963).
When facing the threat of severe punishment, children cited
the threat of punishment as the reason they refrained from
playing with a fun toy, whereas with only a mild threat, children
tended to say they refrained because the toy “isn’t very fun”
— a clear case of “attitude adjustment” to remove conflict
between attitude and behavior. A broad range of cases have
been studied behaviorally among adults, including “counter-
attitudinal” essay writing or speech giving, and “induced
conformity” studies (Cooper, 2007). Connectionist models and
neuroimaging studies of cognitive dissonance have also appeared
(van Veen et al., 2009).
These behavioral studies all recognize some form of
directionally motivated explanation, and all recognize the need to
study the effects of manipulating affect or emotion. We suggest
that non-epistemic motivations of various kinds influence the
vast majority of our explanatory activities, and that one task
for future study of explanation is to design behavioral and
imaging experiments so as to manipulate in a controlled way
the presence of specific sorts of affect or emotion in explanatory
contexts, and to determine how this presence makes a difference
to specific explanatory processes. Work on dissonance reduction
has achieved this to some extent, but the range of motivational
influences is far greater than has been studied so far. Further
work will require a combination of context manipulation,
self-reporting (on emotional experience and on explanatory
procedures) and imaging evidence.
We also suggest that longitudinal studies be undertaken to
determine whether, or to what extent, attitude shifts involved in
dissonance reduction are merely temporary. With the passage
of time, arousal will usually abate, and may not recur as one
thinks back on the original dissonance-producing behavior; in
other cases, recollection of past action may continue to constitute
painful (embarrassing, shameful, guilty) memories. Is the latter
situation one in which our attitude shift is convincing (to
us) and lasting? In the former situation do we maintain our
attitude adjustment only temporarily, so that now we are able to
acknowledge that what we did really was foolish or bad, and to
recognize that our attitude adjustment was our way of avoiding
such acknowledgment? One could extend behavior attribution
and induced conformity experiments to assess whether the
attitudinal changes persist in time and how their temporal history
relates to the presence or absence of dissonance.
Reasoning from Inconsistency to Consistency
Reasoning from inconsistency to consistency in belief is akin
to cognitive dissonance reduction, but need not always involve
actual dissonance. A relatively recent study (Johnson-Laird et al.,
2004) of inconsistency resolution does not address cognitive
dissonance, focusing instead on the process of reasoning itself
rather than the nature of the motivation behind it. The authors
correctly stress the frequent role of explanatory thinking in
bringing our beliefs into consistency and emphasize the need for
further work on how we generate explanations. Their interest
is in how people construct mental models reflecting simple
deductive explanations such as: If Paolo went to get the car,
he will be back in 5min; Paolo went to get the car; Therefore,
Paolo will be back in 5min. When Paolo fails to return in
5min there is a contradiction between this new fact and the
conclusion of one’s previous deduction. Restoring consistency
involves a series of three processes: detection of the inconsistency;
withdrawal of (at least) one of the premises of the initial
deduction; generation of an explanation for Paolo’s failure to
reappear. The authors then describe how people carry out those
processes in terms of either complete or incomplete mental
models of possibilities representing the relevant propositions
and the logical relations among them. Depending on whether
or not people construct complete or incomplete mental models,
the theory predicts that in generating an explanation so as to
remove the inconsistency they will tend to reject the categorical
premise or the conditional premise of the initial reasoning,
respectively. Somewhat different predictions hold if the first
premise is a biconditional. Experimental results support these
predictions.
We have commented elsewhere on what we take to be the
virtues and the limitations of this specific approach to causal
thinking in terms of mental models (Patterson and Barbey, 2012).
Here we suggest that the aim of removing inconsistency by
finding the most probable explanation is only one motive (the
“accuracy” or “epistemic”motive) at work, and that othermotives
can heavily influence the specific manner in which we arrive at
an explanation that removes the contradiction, and can exert
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this influence at multiple stages in the generation, evaluation and
selection of a “best” explanation.
For example, we agree that there are numerous ways one
might explain Paolo’s non-reappearance: he cannot find the car;
he has made a wrong turn on the way back; he is stuck in
traffic; he has he run off to Buenos Aires with his secretary, etc.
(Johnson-Laird et al., 2004; we supplement slightly their stock
of possible explanations, with apologies to Paolo). All of these
would explain the situation and resolve the contradiction. There
are potentially many different explanations that involve denying
the conditional premise of the simple deduction cited above, and
numerous others that would entail denying the other premise.
The issue of interest to us, however, is how motivation affects
the generation of specific explanations of Paolo’s lateness, and
these effects are not accessed via this experimental paradigm.
For the moment we simply stress the potential importance
of directional motivation in constructing such explanations,
regardless of which of the premises are eventually rejected—
and, it is important to add, regardless of whether one frames
the initial situation in terms of a deduction, as in Johnson-
Laird et al. (2004). Thus, in the next section we use the
Paolo example to explore the possible influence of directional
and especially emotion-driven motivation on how one explains
Paolo’s tardiness.
Emotion Confirmation, Emotion Regulation, and
Emotion-driven Explanation
We suggest that there is an “emotional confirmation bias”
analogous to the familiar cognitive confirmation bias, in that
we are typically motivated to favor explanations and beliefs
that confirm our emotional response to some agent, event,
or situation as regards its nature, intensity, and duration.
Dissonance reduction studies assume at least implicitly that
dissonance creates, or itself constitutes, motivation for its
own down-regulation. But precisely how we down-regulate (by
modifying our beliefs, behavior, or values) is another question,
and here emotion, and any affect present in addition to cognitive
dissonance, can have a decisive effect. For example in the Paolo
case his lateness might anger us so that we are receptive to
explanations that not only remove the inconsistency and/or
cognitive dissonance, but also justify our anger (“He’s probably
just taking his sweet time, even though it inconveniences several
others”). Our proposal is that there is a general motivation (and
bias) toward confirmation of one’s emotional or affective state,
where this may happen to produce down-regulation, or up-
regulation, or neither. Thus, emotional confirmation bias is very
wide-ranging, as is the analogous cognitive confirmation bias.
Although we have a general motive to justify our emotions,
and although this will often issue in attempts to explain them
in a way that shows them to be “reasonable” or appropriate,
it is also true that while in the grip of strong emotion such
as rage, jealousy, or hatred we sometimes justify or rationalize
our response by devising explanations that seem, at least to less
involved or dispassionate observers, to be rather arbitrary or even
quite irrational. This suggests a modification of Kunda’s proposal
that directionally biased explanation is constrained by the need
to arrive at an explanation that would be considered plausible by
a dispassionate observer (Kunda, 1990). That is very often true,
but powerful emotion can override even that degree of constraint.
As a corollary we suspect further that in this type of situation
an extreme bias in explanation will have a temporal history
roughly parallel to that of the strong emotion driving it: if over
time the emotion fades, one may retreat to a more epistemically
respectable explanation, admitting for example that one had
angrily “over reacted,” and perhaps proposing an explanation for
why one over reacted.
Returning to the Paolo example, where strong emotions enter
the picture we have equally strong motivation to arrive at
explanations that not only remove cognitive dissonance or any
logical contradiction arising from his surprising lateness, but to
do so in a way that confirms our feeling toward him. We also
call more readily to mind and weigh more heavily background
information that supports such an explanation. Again, emotional
confirmation bias motivates us to generate and accept some
explanation of our emotion that supports its appropriateness,
and it can influence our thinking via more than one explanatory
process (here, for example, comparative credibility ratings on
candidate explanations, memory search for explanations and for
evidence, and weighing of evidence).
Future research on the influence of emotional factors in
explanation will need to vary emotional motivation while holding
other factors in the explanatory situation constant. This would
be parallel to work aimed at varying epistemic motives, as by
telling participants that their explanations would be evaluated by
others, or in general that they would be held responsible for the
accuracy of their explanations. Although anecdotal evidence for
an emotional confirmation bias is all too easily found, systematic
investigation will requiremanipulation of a variety of emotions in
a controlled, measureable, and ethically permissible manner, and
this will be easier said than done. That is not to say that it cannot
be done, although there will be no more simulated electric shock
or prison experiments like those of yesteryear. Appropriate story
materials or videos might prove a useful if limited instrument
(Soussignan, 2002).
Finally, research should look not only for the presence
of emotional confirmation bias, but also for how emotion
influences various specific processes involved in the generation
and evaluation of explanations. We expect that judgments of
simplicity, breadth and depth will be relatively resistant to such
influence, but that many other processes (e.g., memory search,
weighing of evidence, judgments of credibility) will be highly
susceptible, even if not quite “pliant as a windblown sleeve.”
Rationalization of Judgments and Actions
Rationalization, in the sense of explaining one’s judgments or
behavior so as to put them on a “rational basis” or, when there
is some question about their propriety, to justify them, produces
familiar instances of motivational interaction and interference
with epistemic norms. We focus here on one type of case
currently under especially active investigation today—that of
rationalizing one’s moral judgments—then indicate how our
proposal applies also to a broader range of cases.
There is good evidence that people tend to think that they
can explain their responses to questions about moral choices by
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the reasons they have for responding that way. But there is also
evidence that for the most part our moral judgments are in fact
quick and intuitive, and that the justifying explanations we give
for them are usually ad hoc and do not reflect the actual basis of
our judgments (Haidt, 2001). Even when, in the course of a moral
interview all of one’s explanations are shown to be inadequate,
so that one becomes aware of the fact that one has no viable
reason for some particular judgment, one often continues to
affirm the judgment (e.g., “I just know it’s wrong, that’s all”). This
is a familiar result, from Socrates’ cross-examinations of fellow
Greeks to the recent experimental work of “social intuitionists”
(Haidt, 2001; Greene et al., 2004). We have argued elsewhere
(Patterson et al., 2012) that this social intuitionist account of
moral judgment leaves out a large if indirect role for reasoning,
especially on the part of one’s early cultural influences such as
teachers, family, legislators, etc., in the creation of our moral
intuitions themselves, hence an indirect role for reasons and
reasoning in the generation of our intuitive moral judgments.
Nonetheless, the evidence does strongly suggest that people
are routinely motivated to explain or justify themselves; that
they assume their rational justifications (if any) explain their
judgments; and that their judgments are often not in fact based
on any reasons that they themselves are able to supply.
From our point of view the important facts are first, the
presence of a motivation to give one’s moral judgments or
behavior a rational or justificatory basis, especially if one has been
called into question, and second, the potential conflict between
the motivation to justify oneself and the goal of reaching the best
explanation as defined by epistemic norms. Epistemic and self-
justifyingmotives sometimes join forces rather than compete—as
with the innocent but wrongly accused person trying to prove
her innocence—and this can produce an especially thorough
search for evidence, careful weighing of evidence, and so on. But
sometimes the explanation that best satisfies epistemic norms is
not the same as that which best suits other purposes. When the
two diverge we may or may not be aware of this; thus we may
either sincerely believe the two explanations coincide when in
fact they do not, or we may be aware that they do not coincide,
but cynically protest that they do. In the latter case we typically
try to make it appear that the epistemic motive has been served
even if we know very well it has not.
Richard Nixon, for example, may have sincerely believed
that the suppression of certain information about Watergate
(the “cover up”) was motivated by “national security” concerns
or, later on, by concern for “the Presidency itself.” To many
observers a better explanation seemed to be concern for
“Nixon security” or “this President himself.” Some of the latter
observers also thought that Nixon himself was well aware
of this self-serving motivation, and that the true explanatory
motive (survival as President) drove the formulation of the
nobler, self-justifying, explanation deceitfully offered to the
public and to Congress. But it is possible that Nixon himself
believed in some high-minded—and just coincidentally, Nixon-
justifying—explanation of his actions. Whatever Nixon or his
supporters actually believed, his directional motives would
have disposed him to recall, cite, and give special weight
to the sorts of background information that would support
self-justifying explanations. Thus, supporters would cite, and
consider compelling, evidence on one side (e.g., “He has always
proved a staunch defender of national interests, all the way back
to rooting out dangerous Communist spies and sympathizers in
the 1950’s”). By the same token, detractors would think of, and
find compelling, any evidence for the opposite conclusion (e.g.,
“He has always been cynical and self-serving, all the way back to
his days as a Red-baiting Congressman in the 1950’s”).
Thus, each side tends to interpret past actions so that they
fit into a recognized pattern that in turn supports a desired
conclusion. This fitting of events into a pattern is an important
feature of many explanations (Friedman, 1974), and is an
important aspect of establishing the coherence of an explanation
with background information. But the striking aspect of the
Nixon situation was that the two sides, under the influence of two
very different directionalmotivations, interpreted very differently
many of the “same” actions spanning many years of Nixon’s
career, thus producing two very different patterns of behavior—
one self-serving and opportunistic, the other admirably civic-
minded.
In both cases the directional motive tends to influence
explanation in a number of ways: by influencing memory search
for relevant information, weighting of the importance of pieces
of evidence, interpretation of past behavior, failure to consider
seriously alternative interpretations, and failure to recognize
the ambiguity of one’s own evidence. In the end each side’s
explanation not only appears to its adherents to satisfy epistemic
norms, but also appears to them to confirm the prior beliefs
about Nixon that helped produce those explanations. In light
of the importance of emotional factors in this case we suggest
also that both sides’ explanations served the directional motive
of justifying their adherents’ strong emotional attitudes toward
Nixon as a person or his policies.
The interplay of various motives in this case illustrates
the manner in which our explanatory thinking may involve
multiple interacting motivations, of which the purpose of
meeting epistemic norms is only one. In “real life” and especially
in personal or social situations, there will often be multiple
and conflicting motives involved. Explaining how these jointly
influence our thinking as we arrive at a kind of maximally
satisfactory explanation in a particular situation is one of the
great challenges for the study of explanatory thinking. Where
strong emotion is involved, dispassionate assessment of the pros
and cons of possible explanations requires a major effort and
good deal of self-discipline.
Finally, the Nixon case illustrates clearly the influence of
directional explanatory motivation on the interpretation and
possible re-interpretation of information that one does recall
and consider significant. We noted briefly just above how some
of Nixon’s past actions were interpreted in radically different
ways by friends and foes. But events can also be re-interpreted
if one revises one’s estimate of some agent. If the weight of
evidence brings some observers to change their estimation of
Nixon’s character, this will probably result in re-interpretation of
some aspects of the man’s past career. Once more, we suggest
that this is especially likely when strong emotion is involved,
whether in cases of national politics or private affairs. Thus,
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although studies of motivated thinking rightly emphasize the
importance of memory search, it is important to note further
that there is not a fixed range of past experience through which
one then searches in either a biased or unbiased manner. Rather,
to a significant extent the past is subject to interpretation and
reinterpretation in light of our current explanatory motives.
Events that did not seem significant before may now appear
crucial for explaining something important. Or, under changed
circumstances (e.g., if the accumulation of evidence persuades
us that Nixon is not, after all, “a crook,” as he put it), then we
may revise our past interpretation of—and explanations of—
Nixon’s actions. This interpretation and reinterpretation of the
past can occur not just as we attempt to explain the actions
of others, but also as we try to understand our own actions or
judgments.
Avoiding Responsibility, Shifting Blame, Making
Excuses
Cases of avoiding responsibility, shifting blame, or making
excuses overlap with those of self-justifying rationalization, and
of dissonance resolution as well; even so, they constitute special
cases deserving notice in their own right, in that they almost
invariably involve specifically explanatory motivated thinking.
Where one’s behavior is admittedly questionable or wrong, one
may try to avoid responsibility: “The situation left me no choice”;
“Under the circumstances I felt I had to do it, even though I didn’t
want to.” In a legal setting one might explain one’s action as a
“crime of passion,” or as due to “temporary insanity.” In more
mundane settings, we may attempt to lesson our responsibility
with the excuse, “I just don’t know what got into me”; “Sorry; I’m
just very stressed today.” In these last cases the causal explanation
(excuse) suggests either that it wasn’t the “real me” who gave
offense (it was something that got into me; it was just “John
Barleycorn talking”), or that I did not really choose the action,
but was compelled (by overwhelming passion, or a situation
permitting no other course of action), or at least that there were
“extenuating circumstances” (stress, bad hair day) that partially
explain one’s action. Such excuses can certainly be disingenuous,
but we sometimes sincerely attempt to explain ourselves to
ourselves or to others by finding an explanation that (a) seems to
us, in our circumstances and state ofmind, credible and (b) serves
to lessen our responsibility. We often find particular explanations
plausible, and better than other explanations, at least in part
because they fulfill our non-epistemic, self-serving, purposes.
Again, we do not suggest that there is no limit on what we can
believe about ourselves; rather, directional goals can shift our
explanations in a self-serving direction. But by the same token
we suggest once again that this effect will be more pronounced
when our non-epistemic motives include powerful emotional
motivation.
For reasons we need not belabor, similar remarks apply not
only to making excuses for ourselves or justifying our own
behavior, but also to shifting blame from ourselves onto someone
or something else. This begins in early childhood with the simple
andmulti-purpose “He started it,” and continues, with variations,
into adulthood and even onto the international stage—as with
long-term hostilities in which both sides explain and justify their
own actions by reference to some previous action on the part of
their adversary.
Systematic Self-deception: Our Rose-tinted Glasses
Every type of directionally motivated explanation potentially
involves self-deception, and we have already noted several
examples of this. We add here several types familiar from studies
of other phenomena in order to bring out their dependence on
motivated explanation in particular. One type involves biased
general assessments concerning oneself, as well as local bias
concerning a particular situation. For example, most people
are unrealistically optimistic about their chances in life, their
“potential” (Sharot, 2011), their influence, the impression they
create on others, their own virtue, the robustness of their health,
or as Socrates remarked, their own intelligence or good looks
(Plato, Philebus, c. 355 BCE, in Cooper and Hutchinson, 1997).
For example, we are inclined to attribute a rival’s success to “luck,”
or to regard our team’s failure as a “fluke.” People systematically
over-estimate the causal roles of others’ personal traits in
determining their actions while underestimating the influence
of situational factors, a phenomenon known as Fundamental
Attribution Error (Ross, 1977). We tend to rate the reliability of
a medical diagnosis higher or lower, depending on whether we
want to believe the diagnosis (Jemmott et al., 1986; Ditto et al.,
1988), so that we implicitly suggest a “false positive” explanation
for a bad test result); we find more (or less) convincing a study
emphasizing the risk of caffeine for women, depending on what
the study implies about our own risk (Kunda, 1987). These cases
can be psychologically complex, involving confirmation bias,
dissonance reduction, and other factors.What we emphasize here
is that in some cases the recognized tendency to look at things
through “rose-tinted spectacles” also systematically influences
our explanatory thinking.
Fewer people are unrealistically negative in their general
outlook (e.g., pessimists and hypochondriacs), but bias toward
either the positive or negative typically involves a failure to
rigorously apply epistemic norms to explanatory thinking. There
is considerable evidence that this can be beneficial to one’s mental
health, at least in people who manage to maintain an optimistic
outlook, so long as they do not disastrously underestimate
certain risks (e.g., by dismissing the importance of an unwelcome
medical test result). Thus, there is a very widely-shared even
if implicit motivation at work in much of our explanatory
thinking about ourselves, others, and the world in general.
Indeed, biased explanatory thinking in particular cases will tend
to reinforce and perpetuate a “rosy” outlook, which will in
turn influence further particular overly-optimistic explanations.
If this sort of thing is, within limits, beneficial, it is in that
respect a good thing, and even in one clear sense rational to
depart from strict adherence to epistemic norms. Given also that
epistemic rigor can be difficult to achieve, using resources of
time, energy, etc., it is all the more reasonable to forego setting
the epistemic hounds loose on our optimistic interpretations and
explanations of ourselves—again, unless special circumstances
indicate that greater “realism” is needed. Since it also appears
that we are almost constantly weaving explanatory narratives
about ourselves (Lombrozo, 2006), it is fair to say that a
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very large number of our self-explanations are biased by the
purpose of maintaining a view of ourselves and our world
that is in fact unrealistically positive—or in some people, the
opposite.
This is related to the familiar and more general fact that when
it comes to self-understanding, most people tend to trust their
own explanations farther than the evidence warrants (Ostrom
and Walker, 2003). We suggest that generating at least credible
self-explanations not only nudges us toward belief in those
individual explanations, but also strengthens a positive general
assessment of ourselves as cognitive agents.
Giving Explanations: Pedagogy
Giving explanations can involve further processes beyond those
involved in generation and evaluation of explanations for
accuracy. In a broad sense one can always regard the latter
processes as part of giving an explanation to oneself or to
others, so that all the explanations surveyed so far have been
produced in order that they might be given to someone to serve
some purpose or other. But teaching—via lectures, textbooks,
private instruction, etc.—highlights explicitly some important
explanatory challenges that are either left implicit or are simply
not relevant in many explanatory contexts. In rough terms, let
us think of teaching as in part the giving of explanations by
someone more expert to someone less expert. Here giving the
most accurate explanation known to the teacher may not work,
if only because the learner is not yet equipped to understand
it. So a less comprehensive, simplified, analogical, metaphorical,
diagrammatic, or pictorial explanation is called for. As the learner
progresses, explanations can become fuller, deeper, and closer
to an epistemically best explanation of a particular type. Here
the overarching motivation is pedagogical—to help the learner
advance in understanding—but is broken down into a series
of progressive educational stages with corresponding levels of
explanation.
Outside “official” educational contexts one meets similar
explanatory challenges. These we typically try to meet on an ad
hoc basis, again attempting to assess the explainee’s current state
of comprehension, cognitive resources, level of interest (which
we may try to up-regulate), and any practical ends to which the
explanation will be put, in order to generate an explanation that
will advance understanding toward the level of sophistication and
accuracy called for by a specific situation. As always, we may try
to deceive someone; and even if not, we may deliberately offer a
less-than-epistemically-optimal explanation in order to get across
what is truly important for the purpose at hand (e.g., Feynman’s
explanation to Congress of how the Challenger exploded).
Here the study of motivated explanation intersects with a
large body of empirical—and sometimes controversial—work
in education studies. We do not undertake a survey, much
less an independent evaluation, of work in the latter field, but
simply stress the sometimes critically important influence of a
pedagogical motivation on our explanatory practices along with
the special challenges it brings—hence the possibility for future
work to take advantage of existing results about what works and
how in pedagogical contexts.
Motivated Explanation from a Cognitive
Neuroscience Perspective
We now turn to an examination of the neural mechanisms that
underlie the observed role of motivation in human thought and
explanation. We briefly survey two areas: research on motivation
and reward systems, and research on the neural substrates of
motivated reasoning. Specifically, we review how the processes
of thought substitution and thought inhibition contribute to
motivated explanatory reasoning by influencing the generation
and evaluation of explanations.
The Neural Correlates of Motivation
The cognitive neuroscience of motivation in humans has
revealed a cortical-subcortical system supporting representations
of reward and value that are used to modify behavior in pursuit
of goals. Human goals include that of finding epistemically
good explanations, in addition to finding explanations that
serve a wide variety of directional goals. Motivation as the
force behind goal-directed behavior (as opposed to reflexive
and automatic observed actions) is thus supported by a
cortical-subcortical system linking hedonic experience to action
representations. Subcortical structures including the striatum,
ventral tegmentum and nucleus accumbens form a network
using dopamine to signal the receipt and anticipation of
reward (Elliott et al., 2000; Samejima et al., 2005). Note
that the same dopaminergic circuitry supports procedural
memory and conditioned learning, as part of a more general,
distributed brain function of calculating and minimizing
prediction error (Berridge, 2007; Chiu et al., 2008; Rolls et al.,
2008). Cortically, subdivisions of the frontal lobe represent and
manipulate information about rewarding stimuli, among the
other diverse sources of information to which the frontal lobes
are sensitive. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is
believed to support reward-oriented and risk-averse behavior
by representing signals from the striatum when paired with
visual or other predictive signals (Rolls, 2000; Kringelbach,
2005). Together with the anterior cingulate gyrus, activity in
the vmPFC also enables the updating of reward-related paired
associations when environmental contingencies change (Rolls,
2000; Hornak et al., 2004; Hampshire et al., 2012). vmPFC activity
scales proportionately with the subjective value of rewarding
experiences, while dorsolateral activity modulates the intensity
of reward representation according to the context of goals and
intent (i.e., when a particular stimulus is no longer “rewarding”
according to a person’s changing goals, the dlPFC supports the
attenuation of the stimulus-reward mapping; Hare et al., 2009,
2011).
It is controversial whether motivation is supported directly
by the neural correlates of hedonic experience, or instead by
predictive signals and associative learning systems alone, but
hybrid views account for both (see Volkow et al., 2002; Berridge,
2007, for competing theories, and Ettenberg, 2009, for the hybrid
view). What the theories have in common is that regardless of
the view on motivation and reward having dissociable neural
correlates, motivation clearly relies on linking prior rewards to
the prediction and pursuit of future reward.
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This is important to the discussion on motivated reasoning,
because at its core, the existence of motivated reasoning relies
on the ability of an individual to predict emotion states that
are linked to a particular idea being true (or, as in several
cases discussed above, to an idea’s appearing to be true to
some relevant agent), and then adjust the reasoning process
accordingly. This applies to any of the examples of non-epistemic
motivations discussed here: self-justifying bias, confirmation
bias, dissonance resolution, blame shifting, escapism, and so on.
By analogy to goal-directed behavior, in which we use input
from the reward-motivation system to predict action outcomes
and adjust behavior accordingly, there must be similar input
from the motivation system in reasoning under non-epistemic
motivations that assigns value to a given explanation, based on
its predicted association with some directional goal.
As others have noted elsewhere, the exact mechanisms linking
reward representation, motivation and action control processes
in the brain have yet to be fully explored. Exploring the similarly
ambiguous link between motivation and reflective reasoning
processes is likely to shed light on the motivated decision-making
process as well.
The Neural Correlates of Motivated Reasoning
Relatively few studies have directly measured the neural basis
of reasoning under varying motivational states. The realm of
political beliefs is one exception, and one in which people
are measurably susceptible to the forces of non-epistemic
motivations. Presented with some discrepancy between a
politician’s statements and actions, we might be more motivated
to look for circumstances beyond the politician’s control or to
blame the politician’s character flaws, depending on our party
affiliations. Self-described “committed partisans” (e.g., those
involved in the Nixon case discussed previously) in an fMRI
study were shown discrepancies between the statements and
actions of political leaders in their own parties, to compare
the neural response measured to that when considering the
actions of neutral candidates (Westen et al., 2006). The posterior
cingulate and precuneus were activated by observing any conflict
between statements and actions, regardless of the politician’s
party affiliation. The desire to explain a person’s actions favorably
in spite of conflicting evidence also engaged the vmPFC and
ventral anterior cingulate gyrus: regions generally implicated in
emotion processing and reasoning. When compared with later
consideration of exculpatory evidence, the initial consideration of
contradictory evidence engaged the left lateral inferior prefrontal
cortex and left insula, which are both implicated in interoception,
self-concept and negative emotion. The effect of political party
affiliation in this study paradigm indicated that attention and
conflict monitoring systems are engaged when people come
across inconsistencies, but ventral emotion-processing systems
come online when a person’s search for an explanation is also
constrained by the desire to draw a conclusion maintaining
favorable self-image or consistency of beliefs. The brain processes
information differently depending on the consequences that the
information at hand has for our desired conclusions or end
states.
Returning to the other non-epistemic motivations that
could influence a reasoning process in general, we count self-
justification, dissonance resolution, confirmation bias, optimism
and escapism among the possible goals. The tendency for people
to selectively weight positive information and disregard negative
self-referential information (as discussed in the Section entitled
“Systematic Self-deception: Our Rose-tinted Glasses”) can be
attenuated by interrupting cortical function in the left inferior
frontal gyrus (Sharot et al., 2012). Belief updating is believed
to engage multiple regions in the prefrontal cortex, but the left
ventral PFC in particular appears to support the integration
of new evidence with prior beliefs by tracking prediction
errors, especially favorable surprises; negative information is
selectively represented by the right ventral PFC, with differences
in the strength of activation between people who tend to be
optimistic or pessimistic, as discussed in the Section entitled
“Systematic Self-deception: Our Rose-tinted Glasses” (Sharot
et al., 2011). In addition to sensitivity for positive information,
the left ventral PFC could serve an inhibitory function over the
incorporation of negative information into the belief updating
process. Such a positivity bias could plausibly serve as one
mechanism supporting the ability to reason toward directionally
motivated explanations, while also preserving the illusion of
purely epistemic motivation due to the belief updating processes’
still being implemented, albeit in an altered manner. This would
support self-deception; it is plausible that cases of conscious,
deliberate deception would involve either: (a) generation of at
least two explanations, one of which we took to be epistemically
the best, the other being the directionally-motivated one we
actually give to others, or (b) simply giving an explanation we
do not think is correct, but without thinking that we know the
correct explanation.
Motivated Control of Attention and Memory
Neuroscience evidence suggests a role played by non-epistemic
motivation states in controlling and supporting other cognitive
functions, especially concerning memory retrieval, that may
indirectly influence explanatory reasoning. Several experimental
paradigms were developed specifically with the goal of
demonstrating the differences in recall between items in
memory that were intentionally remembered or willfully
forgotten. Directed forgetting experiments attempt to disrupt
memory encoding by instructing participants to remember or
forget study stimuli immediately after their initial presentation
(Fawcett and Taylor, 2008). Think/No-Think experiments
instead allow participants to encode arbitrary relations between
items by rehearsing them to a criterion of performance on
tested recall, before instructing participants to block recall of
the second item in a pair when presented with its paired “cue,”
presumably to only disrupt the memory system at the retrieval
phase before the testing phase (Anderson and Green, 2001).
Each of the paradigms demonstrates the successful disruption
of memory retrieval, while fMRI and electrophysiology evidence
converge on the finding that right lateral PFC activation and left
hippocampal deactivation are the neural markers of motivated
forgetting (Anderson and Hanslmayr, 2014). The observed
neural activations and behavioral effects are consistent with
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the thought suppression hypothesis of motivated forgetting,
as shown in a memory-specific and hippocampus-targeted
application of domain-general inhibitory control that is also
supported by the right ventrolateral PFC (Anderson et al.,
2004; Aron et al., 2004). It remains unclear whether thought
suppression occurs by general inhibition of memory processing
systems, or instead by the inhibition of specific memory traces;
some have argued that current methods lack the behavioral
specificity or spatial resolution in imaging to differentiate the
two (Depue, 2012). However, it appears to us that motivated
thinking in general, and motivated explanation in particular, do
not involve a general inhibition of memory systems, but typically
enhance memory for some information (that supporting a
desired result) while inhibiting memory for other information.
That is, in “trace” language, motivation effectively highlights
some traces while leaving others at least temporarily in the dark.
Thought substitution is another mechanism of motivated
forgetting, in which a memory targeted for forgetting is replaced
by directing attention to another thought that can be paired
with the original cue. Substitution, or competitive attention, is
supported by different neural mechanisms than those supporting
inhibition, due to its reliance on encoding and retrieving an
alternativememory (Depue, 2012). Consistent with current views
on directed retrieval, thought substitution engages both the
left inferior frontal gyrus and the hippocampus (Anderson and
Hanslmayr, 2014).
The findings on motivated forgetting are relevant to the
discussion on motivated explanation in more than one way:
retrieval of candidate explanations from storage in long-term
memory is one step amongmany comprising inference to the best
explanation under any motivation state; in addition, the process
of confirming or disconfirming a candidate explanation that we
may or may not want to accept involves, among other things,
retrieval of confirming or disconfirming evidence. Processes
that influence initial retrieval of explanations or of pertinent
evidence would thus have downstream effects on any subsequent
calculations in the brain, up to and including the final acceptance
of an explanation as a confidently-held belief. Another possibility,
however, is that thought substitution and inhibitory thought
suppression are more extensive than can be inferred from
the findings on memory alone. Thought substitution and
suppression could thus enter the reasoning process twice: once
at the level of memory retrieval, and again at the level of
manipulating newly-encountered information, or information
already being held in attention among competing explanations
while reasoning to the best one. This would be an important
factor, for example, in interpreting or reinterpreting propositions
potentially relevant to the plausibility of explanations we are
directionally motivated to accept or avoid. This possibility
remains speculative until it can be tested directly—ideally, for
situations in which motivation is more clearly defined and
affective factors can be manipulated.
Integrating the Neuroscience Evidence on
Motivated Cognition
Together, the findings on the neural correlates of motivation
and mechanisms of motivation-cognition interaction provide
evidence for a tight coupling between non-epistemic motives
and reasoning that includes both memory retrieval and the
subsequent processing of current evidence in light of prior beliefs.
This much is consistent with early views on the purely cognitive
approach to studying motivated reasoning, which suggested
a truncated or modified memory search for explanations as
the driving mechanism (Kunda, 1990). However, directionally
motivated reasoning may involve further processing systems
as well. We have highlighted several cases of emotion-driven
explanation, and also proposed a general motivation toward
“emotional confirmation” parallel to the familiar cognitive
confirmation bias. At present, however, it remains to be
discovered exactly how motivation and reasoning systems in the
brain interact with one another.
The flexibility of explanatory inference can be demonstrated
at the behavioral level. Specifically, the plausibility of individual
explanations is discounted when rival explanations with
different mechanisms are simply considered at the same
time, regardless of the respective explanations’ individual
plausibility (Sloman, 1994). This suggests that the plausibility
of individual explanations is not “fixed,” then held constant
during comparative evaluation; rather, credibility ratings of
individual explanations can change, even without addition of
any directly disconfirming evidence (a further question would be
whether elimination of a competing explanation thereby raises
the credibility of the remaining competitors). An additional
implication is that even if the observed adjustments do not
change comparative credibility ratings, they do constitute in
effect a revision of our confidence in the “best” explanation.
Perhaps further, if one considers an increasing number of at least
moderately credible alternative explanations, one’s credibility
rating of the “best” explanation might sink to the point that
one no longer regards it as the correct explanation, but only
as a possibility that is somewhat more plausible than the
rest. The neural mechanisms that would underlie either the
actual behavioral results cited above, not to mention these
further behavioral speculations, are far from clear. One can see
nonetheless a plausible explanation of a familiar argumentative
strategy: if we want to undercut someone’s confidence in a
particular explanation (e.g., when they postulate an unsavory
intention behind someone’s unwelcome behavior, or willful
negligence on someone’s part leading to a serious accident),
we sometimes generate and propose reasonable alternative
explanations. If we can produce multiple alternatives we
may rightly say, “There are lots of other ways that could
well have happened; you don’t need to think anyone was
negligent.” This would be an additional way in which directional
motivation influences the generation of explanations and thereby
influences judgments of credibility on candidate explanations.
But again, this is simply a suggestion that calls for further
investigation.
The neural mechanisms of motivated forgetting also warrant
further exploration. Settling the distinction between general
inhibition of memory systems or direct suppression of individual
suppositions, as appears to occur routinely in directionally
motivated explanation, appears to be as elusive as early attempts
to search for the memory “engram” in the brain. And as with
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the search for an engram, even if we should discover the
inhibition of a single memory trace, parallel to the discovery
of visual processing neurons specific to a single face, we may
be asking the wrong questions if the answers do not map
onto human cognition in natural settings. Inhibition of memory
traces or entire information processing systems in the bore of
an MR machine may not have anything to do with forgetting,
or selectively remembering, events that carry intense emotional
value. Paradoxically, having reason to want to forget something,
or to believe it, could even be revealed to preclude the ability
to do so by means of “make-believe” or self-deception. To
draw meaningful conclusions about how function in the brain
supports mental function in daily life, it will be necessary to study
memory for complicated personal events, and reasoning about
explanations that are of consequence in several different sorts of
ways to the person doing the reasoning.
We must remind ourselves that the current evidence
concerning the neural correlates of motivated abductive
reasoning is indirect, and will remain incomplete until direct
evidence is available to evaluate the predictions suggested here.
In addition, most other processes (besides motivated forgetting)
involved in the generation and evaluation of explanations—along
with the influence of motivation on those processes—remain
even more in the dark.
Future Directions for Studying Motivated
Explanation in Cognitive Neuroscience
Much in the study of motivated explanation, and motivated
thinkingmore generally, remains virtual terra incognita—starting
with the processes involved in the generation of explanations.
Most work in the philosophy of science and empirical psychology
has focused either on normative criteria of explanation (what’s
epistemically “best”) or on sources of error due to a variety
of widespread cognitive heuristics, biases, and other natural
pitfalls. Much less is known about how motivation influences
explanatory thinking, although we have been here able to draw
on several helpful studies of explanation on the one hand, and
of motivated thinking in general on the other. Our approach has
been to set forth the multiple processes involved in generating
and evaluating explanations, then to highlight specific types of
explanatory motivation, indicating how they typically interact
with those explanatory processes at the behavioral level. We
predict that further study on the neural correlates of motivated
explanation and reasoning will shed light on which aspects of
explanation are susceptible to influence by motivational states.
Specifically, we anticipate that the thought substitution and
thought inhibition mechanisms that influence memory retrieval
can be willfully applied during the reasoning process to help
a person reach a desired conclusion. Furthermore, we expect
the neural correlates of emotion and value to be activated by
reasoning under conditions of directional motivation, although
they would not be sufficient to influence the reasoning process
without the engagement of executive control and attentional
brain networks.
One approach to testing our hypotheses linking motivational
states and the reasoning process is to have participants in a
functional neuroimaging study perform some task involving a
conflict between beliefs and evidence, thereby creating a conflict
between themotivation to confirm prior beliefs and the epistemic
motivation to know the truth. Yet another approach is to
divide participants into groups who can be plausibly expected to
respond differently to some emotionally-arousing or motivation-
inducing visual stimuli, again while imaging their regional
neural activations. Both of these experimental designs have been
reported before, as reviewed in the current article. What remains
to be discovered is the mechanism for motivation-reasoning
interaction, and not simply a series of brain regions or a network
whose activity corresponds to an interaction that can be assumed
to be taking place. A first step toward uncovering themechanisms
for motivation-reasoning interaction will be to use a block-
related imaging study design, in which successive experimental
blocks in an fMRI protocol will selectively involve manipulations
of the generation or evaluation of possible explanations in a
reasoning task. If the possible explanations are generated by the
experimenters for a participant, then the other behavioral degrees
of freedom would involve evaluative components of reasoning,
and vice-versa.
Finally, we expect real-time functional neuroimaging to be
a useful tool in exploring the relationship between motivation
and explanation in the brain. At the proof-of-concept level, it
has been shown that by using the features of a motivationally-
arousing visual stimulus as a feedback signal communicating
a change in brain activity, study participants can learn to
successfully modulate or inhibit brain activity in the networks
corresponding to motivational arousal and visual cue reactivity
(Sokunbi et al., 2014). If this could be applied in the reasoning
context as well as in passive stimulus-viewing, then it may not
be necessary to separate participants into groups who “should”
be motivated a certain way by study stimuli. It may be similarly
unnecessary to covertly manipulate participants’ motivation to
reach a particular conclusion or to create conflicts between
belief and evidence. Instead, a vignette-based probabilistic
reasoning task could be constructed with emotionally-arousing
case materials, imaging brain activity as participants naturally
respond to the stimuli while being instructed to alternately
inhibit their emotions or respond freely. The successful self-
regulation of emotion and motivational circuitry in the brain
could then be used as a regressor predicting particular
patterns of responses to the underlying probabilistic reasoning
task.
It is plausible that behavioral and neuroimaging studies of
priming effects (e.g., Schacter et al., 2004) could shed light on
the effects of motivation. Insofar as one can distinguish the
neural systems involved in classical priming studies from those
involved in thought substitution and thought suppression, one
could consider explanatory motivation as a type of primer, and
a distinctive source of bias in memory search and in current
perception of factors potentially supporting or disconfirming a
preferred explanation.
Conclusion
Our aim has been to demonstrate both the very wide scope
and influence of motivation on the multiple stages and
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processes involved in the construction, evaluation and giving of
explanations on the one hand, and the fact that most of this
influence still awaits exploration on the other. Regarding the
latter, we have made a number of suggestions for future study,
both behavioral and neuroscientific.
We endorse the basic distinction drawn by others between
epistemic and non-epistemic (directional) motivation, and
have illustrated through concrete cases the way(s) in which
motivations such as shifting blame, resolving cognitive
dissonance, maintaining self-esteem, securing social harmony,
and several more interact with explanatory processes and
with various sorts of motivation to meet epistemic norms.
At several points we have cited relevant work that is
usually thought of in other terms, suggesting that it in
fact can shed light on motivated explanation, and we have
made specific suggestions along the way concerning future
research.
We have emphasized throughout that finding and giving
explanations is, like much else, a matter of meeting goals
whose nature, timing, and urgency vary with circumstances,
and that we very often have more than one motivation—
some epistemic, some directional—for pursuing a particular
explanation. These motivations can reinforce one another or
they may conflict, since the explanation that best serves one
purpose (e.g., securing social reconciliation) may or may not
be the best explanation for other purposes (e.g., finding the
most accurate explanation of someone’s behavior). Where the
two diverge we may succeed in finding a compromise solution,
but we are sometimes motivated to find an explanation that
serves one purpose at the expense of another. If so, our
motivation may yet call for creating the appearance of meeting
the sacrificed goal as part of a strategy for meeting our primary
goal.
Finally, we emphasize once more the importance of emotion,
and affect in general: it can powerfully drive any of the
motivations, both epistemic and directional, considered here,
and in fact is probably an element in all the directional
motivations surveyed above (avoiding blame, bringing about
reconciliation, etc.) Beyond that we have suggested that
emotion generates its own source of explanatory bias, in
that it motivates us to explain our emotion to ourselves, to
understand our emotion, in a way that confirms it (shows
it appropriate, rationalizes it). This “emotional confirmation
bias” we take to be distinct from and parallel to the
more familiar and better-studied cognitive confirmation bias
concerning our beliefs. Moreover, affect probably is present
to some extent even in the most “purely cognitive” effort to
find an explanation, in the form of an evolved inclination to
understand our environment in causal/explanatory terms and
to receive at least a small reward when we think we achieve
such understanding. In short, explanatory thinking cannot be
understood without taking affect into account along with all the
other processes that give rise to and constrain our explanatory
thinking.
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